AHIS3051 [Proposal Code 23485]

Sponsor
Jennifer Newman

Course Code
AHIS3051

Course Title
Athens and Empire

Course Title (short)
Athens and Empire

Effective Date
Semester 1 - 2004

Units
10

Course Level
3000

Managing Campus
Callaghan

Grading Basis
Graded

Field of Education
090305

Industrial Experience
No

Course Description.
A historical study of Athens, 479-411 B.C., which involves also the study of Thucydides as a historian and Aristophanes as a source for Athenian history and society. Changes in ideas about the world, morality and the gods will also be examined, as well as the development of democratic and anti-democratic propaganda.

Replacing Courses.
AHIS3050 Democratic Athens in Growth and Crisis

Transitional Arrangements.
Students who have completed AHIS3050 will not be eligible to enrol in AHIS3051.

Course Rationale.
Classical Athens was the cornerstone of so much of our Western heritage, including foundation of modern political thought, democracy, oligarchy, adult franchise and pay for public service. The evidence introduces literature which has profoundly influenced European
ideology, including Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, the Athenian orators, and the tragedians and comic poets. This evidence also enables close investigation of a political system during prosperity and crisis that offers a striking example to our own. It is a course which would also be of interest to students of philosophy, political science and history. The course will contribute to the BA course objectives of
1. an appreciation of the depth and breadth of knowledge in the humanities
2. a capacity to think critically and creatively about society
3. high level oral and written communication skills; and
4. responsiveness to the demands of the workplace and the broader community.
This course contributes to a major in Ancient History in the Bachelor of Arts. It is also available as an option for students undertaking other programs and majors.

Course Objectives.
As a result of participating in this subject, students should develop:
1. A sound knowledge and understanding of democratic Athens in the Classical period, its institutions and context
2. Recognition of important historical and literary themes and issues; such as the growth of imperialism, stasis (or internal turmoil) in Greek city-states under crisis, the development of political "types" (oligarchs, demagogues, etc), the need for sophistry and the development of moral nihilism, the financing of democracy, etc.
3. An appreciation of the range, strengths and weaknesses of our ancient sources for fifth century Athens; from written historical texts, dramatic performances, epigraphy, to surviving art and architecture
4. Skills in using and evaluating ancient source material for gaining information, as well as using modern studies in conjunction with the ancient sources to establish, develop and support interpretations of the period.

Course Content.
1. Persia and the Greeks, Delian League
2. Thucydides
3. Democratic Government and Propaganda: the 'Golden Age' of Athens
4. Peloponnesian War
5. Comedy and War-time Athens
6. Civil Strife
7. Religious crises, Sophists and oligarchs

Assumed Knowledge.
20 units at any level in Ancient History or History

Course Evaluation.
SEC evaluation

Contact Hours

CONVERSION: 2 hours per week, plus tutorial every second week

Assessment

CONVERSION
Assessment is a combination of progressive coursework and a major essay

1. Short research paper or equivalent task @ 25% (ca. 1000 words each)
Due early semester

2. Source analysis task @ 25% (ca. 1,000 words)
Due mid semester

3. Major essay @ 50% (ca. 2,000 words)

Due late semester

Teaching Methods
Lecture
Tutorial

Modes of Delivery
Internal Mode

Programs
10435 - B Arts
10847 - B Arts [CC]
10947 - B Teaching / B Arts

Requisites

Teaching Distribution

Callaghan

School of Liberal Arts
100%

Resources

Are additional library resources required?
No

Is additional software (or software upgrades) required in central computing labs?
No

Is additional software required in faculty computing labs?
No

Is additional space required for this course including: timetabled teaching space; special purpose laboratory space; or extra office space requirements for new members of staff?
No

Are additional teaching technology resources required, e.g. document camera, data projectors, videoconferencing, etc?
No

Are additional staffing resources required for this course?
No

Is additional major equipment required?
No
Does this course proposal require field equipment, visiting speakers, samples, demonstrations, laboratory equipment beyond current requirements?
No

Plagiarism
A student plagiarises if he or she gives the impression that the ideas, words or work of another person are the ideas, words or work of the student.
Plagiarism includes:
- copying any material from books, journals study notes or tapes, the web, the work of other students, or any other source without indicating this by quotation marks or by indentation, italics or spacing and without acknowledging that source by footnote or citation;
- rephrasing ideas from books, journals, study notes or tapes, the web, the work of other students, or any other source without acknowledging the source of those ideas by footnotes or citations; or
- unauthorised collaboration with other students that goes beyond the discussion of general strategies or other general advice.
Plagiarism is not only related to written works, but also to material such as data, images, music, formulae, websites and computer programs.
Aiding another student to plagiarise is also a violation of the Plagiarism Policy and may invoke a penalty.

For further information on the University policy on plagiarism, please refer to
http://www.newcastle.edu.au/policy/academic/general/plagiarism_pol-03.htm

Extension of Time for Assessment Items, Deferred Assessment and Special Consideration for Assessment Items or Formal Written Examinations
Any student:
1. who is applying for an extension of time for submission of an assessment item on the basis of medical, compassionate, hardship/trauma or unavoidable commitment: or
2. whose attendance at or performance in an assessment item or formal written examination has been or will be affected by medical, compassionate, hardship/trauma or unavoidable commitment: must report the circumstances, with supporting documentation, to the appropriate officer on the prescribed form.

Please go to the Policy and the on-line form for further information, particularly for information on the options available to you, at:

Changing your Enrolment
HECS Census Dates (last dates to withdraw without financial or academic penalty): list the dates for both semesters (ie, 31 March and 31 August) Last Dates to withdraw without academic penalty: list the dates of the last days of both semesters To change your enrolment online, please refer to
http://www.newcastle.edu.au/study/enrolment/change-enrol.html

Contact Details
The Faculty Student Services Office
The Dean of Students is Associate Professor Loris Chahl.
Various services are offered by the University Student Support Unit:

Dr Elizabeth Baynham
Office: MCMLG 19
Ph: (02) 49215232
e-mail: Elizabeth.Baynham@newcastle.edu.au

AHIS3051 ATHENS AND EMPIRE Handbook Description
Enquiries: School of Social Sciences

Semester 1 - 2006
Activity                Day      Time        Room       Comments
Lecture                 Tuesday  3.00 PM - 5.00 PM [V07]
and Tutorial            Tuesday  12.00 noon - 1.00 PM [MCLG44]
or Tuesday              2.00 PM - 3.00 PM [GP2-18]
or Tuesday              5.00 PM - 6.00 PM [GP2-16]
### AHIS 3051: Athens and Empire

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<th>Lectures</th>
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<td>1.</td>
<td>21st Feb.</td>
<td>Background to the Greek World in 479 The Nature of the Evidence</td>
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<td>2.</td>
<td>28th Feb</td>
<td>Foundation of the Delian League Development and transformation of the League</td>
<td>The Delian League</td>
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<td>3.</td>
<td>7th March</td>
<td>Sparta in the Fifth Century Development of hostility between Athens and Sparta</td>
<td>Short Essay due</td>
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<td>4.</td>
<td>14th March</td>
<td>Athens and Persia The Workings of the Empire</td>
<td>Sparta’s foreign policy</td>
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<td>5.</td>
<td>21st March</td>
<td>Democratic revolution in Athens Pericles and the ‘Golden Age’</td>
<td>No tutorial</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>29th March</td>
<td>Thucydides: his life and experience Thucydides as a historian</td>
<td>Athens and Persia</td>
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<td>7.</td>
<td>4th April</td>
<td>Thucydides on the Origin of War Aristophanes on the Origin of War</td>
<td>Source Analysis due</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>11th April</td>
<td>Pericles’ Funeral Oration: Vision and Reality Strategy in the Archidamian War</td>
<td>Athens Under Pericles</td>
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**EASTER RECESS FROM FRIDAY APRIL 14 - FRIDAY APRIL 28**

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<td>9.</td>
<td>2nd May</td>
<td>Naval Warfare in the Greek World Aristophanes on War and Politics</td>
<td>The Megarian Decree</td>
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<td>10.</td>
<td>9th May</td>
<td>Sophists and Oligarchs The Morality of Empire: Thucydides’ Melian Dialogue</td>
<td>Pylos and Sphacteria</td>
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<td>11.</td>
<td>16th May</td>
<td>The Peace of Nicias The Rise of Alcibiades</td>
<td>No tutorial</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>23rd May</td>
<td>Background to Sicilian Expedition Reasons for the Disaster</td>
<td>The Hermae and the Mysteries</td>
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<td>13.</td>
<td>30th May</td>
<td>The Effect of the Disaster: General Revolt in Athens’ Empire Athens and the Future</td>
<td>Major Essay due June 9</td>
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TUTORIALS

There are no formal marks given for attendance or performance. **BUT** rolls will be kept and a student’s good record of attendance will count in his/her favour in cases where a final result is borderline; ie, regular tutorial participation might make a difference in going up a grade. We appreciate that many students juggle work and family commitments, but nevertheless, even with the best intentions in the world, if you do not attend classes regularly it sends a pretty powerful message to your lecturer that you are not really interested in the subject. If you are experiencing genuine difficulties, please advise the Course Controller.

A tutorial is not meant to be a mini-lecture from the tutor and it is important that all students do some preparatory reading. You will not be expected to read all the material listed (although obviously, the more you read, the more you will know); however, it is particularly important that **everybody reads the relevant ancient sources**. A lively and interesting tutorial discussion depends very much upon the people who make up the group, and every individual’s contribution helps.

**AHIS 3051: Guide to Bibliography Format in Ancient History.**

These notes are for guidance only; you won’t lose marks if you don’t use this recommended format (because conventions vary according to publishers and journals), but it will enhance your presentation if you make the effort. The notes give the most convenient method of referring to ancient sources and modern literature. However, any system of reference is acceptable provided that it is internally consistent.

**Primary Sources**

Here give publication details of the translations you have used, and any collections of ancient materials in translation. In the footnotes to the text you should refer to the material **either** by book and chapter (or line number) **or** by page of translation.

*eg. Thuc. 1. 98 or Thuc. p.93 (Penguin)*

- Aristophanes *Acharnians* line 118 or Aristophanes, *Acharnians* p. 54
- Plut. *Cimon* 15 or Plut. p. 157 (Penguin)
- Fornara no.66, line 10

The following format is best for the bibliography proper:

**Aristophanes**


**Aristotle**

Diodorus Siculus

Translated by C. H. Oldfather. Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA, 1961)

Fornara

Archaic times to the end of the Peloponnesian War.
Edited and translated by C. W. Fornara (second edition: Cambridge, 1983)

Herodotus

The Histories. Translated by Aubrey de Selincourt.
Revised with an Introduction and Notes by A. R. Burn (Harmondsworth, 1976)

Plutarch

Plutarch. The Rise and Fall of Athens. Translated with an
Introduction by I. Scott-Kilvert (Harmondsworth, 1976)

Thucydides

The Peloponnesian War. Translated by R. Warner with an
Introduction by M. I. Finley (Harmondsworth, 1982)

Modern Literature

Give full publication details for all books, chapters in books or journal articles. You
may refer to this material in abbreviated form in the footnotes. The simplest
referencing system is the so-called Harvard style, which requires only author’s name,
publlication date and page numbers. If you prefer, you may also use your own
abbreviations.
eg. Cawkwell 1970: 45 or Cawkwell, Blaiklock Essays 45
Culham 1978 or Culham AJAH 1978
Meiggs 1972: 342-5 or Meiggs, Athenian Empire 342-5
Barrett 1977: 298-9 or Barrett, GRBS 1977. 298-9

For the full bibliography at the end of the essay you may use any consistent system,
provided that it gives full publication details. The following style, to be used with the
Harvard system, is probably the easiest:

Studies 18: 291-305

Classical Essays presented to E. M. Blaiklock (Auckland): 39-58

of Ancient History 3: 27-31


Ancient History 5: 64-96, 110-33

If you use the abbreviated style, something like the following is recommended.
Barrett, J. F. ‘The Downfall of Themistocles’, *Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies* 18 (1977) 291-305


Meiggs, R *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford, 1972)

This essay is designed to consolidate the work done during the first weeks of the Semester, and to give students some early feedback. All references and readings will be found in the notes for the first tutorial in WEEK 2 on the Delian League in the Course Guide. You should find the tutorial discussion helpful. The maximum length is 1,000 words (excluding footnotes), so you will need to keep your discussion firmly focused on the essay topic. Base your discussion on the ancient sources, and refer to all ancient material and modern discussion in your footnotes with appropriate documentation (see the Guide to Bibliography Format in Ancient History). It is important that all students meet this deadline; extensions will be granted only in exceptional circumstances. Otherwise penalties will be deducted for late submission.

QUESTION:

Are there any indications in the source tradition that the Athenians were bent on hegemony in the League of allies as early as 478 B.C.?
Select any Two of the following passages, and write commentaries on their historical content. Be careful to direct your comments to the precise context of the passages. Note and discuss other source material that enlarges or contradicts the material in the passages under analysis. You should spell out exactly what problems (if any) the passages present and indicate how they add to our historical knowledge. Keep as closely to the passages as possible, and do not attempt to write an essay on the general context. No potted histories of the Athenian Empire, please. Keep your commentary on each passage to 500 words (i.e., 1,000 for the two). This is quite restrictive, and you will need to keep your commentary centred on what is absolutely relevant.

The passages have been taken from the material covered in the lectures and tutorials between weeks 3 and 6. You will find adequate reading matter in the tutorial sheets and lecture handouts.

1. “But a member of the Gerousia, Hetoemaridas by name, who was a direct descendant of Heracles and enjoyed favour among the citizens by reason of his character, undertook to advise that they leave the Athenians with their leadership, since it was not in Sparta’s interest, he declared, to lay claim to the sea. He was able to bring pertinent arguments in support of his surprising proposal, so that, against the expectation of all, he won over both the Gerousia and the people.”

   (Diodorus 11.50)

2. “And yet Callisthenes does not state that the barbarian made this compact, but claims that he did what he did because of the fear which the defeat (at the Eurymedon) inspired in him, and that he kept so far away from Greece that Pericles with fifty ships and Ephialtes with only thirty sailed beyond the Chelidonian isles without meeting any naval force from the barbarian side.”

   (Plutarch Cimon 13*)

3. “And with regard to my factual reporting of the events of the war I have made it a principle not to write down the first story that came my way, and not to be guided by my own general impressions; either I was present myself at the events which I have described or else I heard of them through eye-witnesses whose reports I have checked with as much thoroughness as possible.”

   (Thucydides 1.22)

* This is Bosworth’s translation, closer to the Greek than Scott-Kilvert’s version in Plutarch, The Rise and Fall of Athens 155.
"After this Naxos left the League, and the Athenians made war on the place. After a siege Naxos was forced back into allegiance. This was the first case when an allied city was enslaved contrary to established practice, and the process was repeated in the cases of the other allies as various circumstances arose."

(Thucydides 1.98)

This passage ends Thucydides’ treatment of the first years of expansion after the formation of the so-called “Delian League”. Thucydides is here following his programme (1.97) of documenting the chief events of the period between the Persian and Peloponnesian Wars, and he lays special emphasis on Athenian actions “against their own allies when they revolted.” The campaign against Naxos comes at the end of a series of campaigns which show increasing harshness on the part of the Athenians. First comes the capture of Eion and the enslavement of its population; next the occupation of Scyros with the expulsion or enslavement of its non-Greek inhabitants and the coercing of Carystus into the alliance. The action against Naxos marks the next stage. For Thucydides it amounted to enslavement and it was violation of established practice. The terminology is obscure, but it suggests a sinister development: enslavement of an enemy (Eion), of a non-Greek community (Scyros), of a Greek unattached city (Carystus) and finally of a Greek allied state. Just what the enslavement entailed is not spelled out. However, the Athenians cannot have made slaves of the population, for Naxos continued in the alliance, paying one of the highest tribute assessments (6.4000 talents). It is most likely that the walls of Naxos were demolished and her navy impounded and possibly there was a garrison imposed under the command of Athenian officers. That was an infringement of autonomy which in Greek eyes amounted to slavery.¹ Thucydides also states that the Athenian action was “contrary to established practice.”² It is a very vague expression, but it suggests that the treatment of Naxos in some ways violated the norms of hegemonic behaviour and was more draconian than would be expected. We might perhaps

¹ See for instance the protests of the Melians when the Athenians propose force them into the alliance. Their alternatives, they claim, are war or slavery (Thuc. 5.86). Capitulation to the Athenian hegemony is de facto enslavement, even though for the Athenians the terms are generous: “alliance on a tribute paying basis and liberty to enjoy your own property (Thuc. 5.111).”

² That is the literal translation of the Greek phrase para; to; kaqesthkov”. It does not imply that the Athenians were acting contrary to “the original constitution of the League”, as the Penguin translation has it.
compare the Spartans’ treatment of Aegina, a member of the Peloponnesian League which had rebelled and defied King Cleomenes; they simply took ten hostages, to be guarded at Athens (Hdt. 6.50, 73). The Athenian treatment of their recalcitrant allies was unusually harsh, as Thucydides emphasises in the following chapter (1.99).

Nothing is known of the Naxian revolt outside Thucydides. He refers to it in passing later (1.137), in the context of Themistocles’ flight to Ionia, some time before the death of Xerxes (August 465). That gives a conjectural framework for the Naxian affair. This was the great period of Athenian expansion, culminating in the great victory of the Eurymedon, which Thucydides (1.100) places after Naxos. It looks as though the Naxian revolt came in the immediate prelude and hampered the actions of the alliance at a time when it was set for a major push to the east. Under those circumstances it is not surprising that the Athenian response was harsh. The siege may well have been protracted. Naxos was a rich and powerful state, considerably the largest island in the Cyclades, and in 499 it had withstood siege from a powerful Persian fleet, which left frustrated after four months (Hdt. 5.34). Then the islanders had laid in supplies, and they will have done the same before defecting from the Athenian alliance. It would have taken a major military effort to force their surrender: Samos, an island of comparable size, held out for nine months in 441/40 against an expanding Athenian attack force which in the end numbered over 200 ships (Thuc. 1.117).

Thucydides adds that other states individually suffered the same fate as Naxos, and claims that “the principal complaints of revolt” were failure to provide the full tally of ships or tribute. This suggests that the Athenians regarded any shortfall in treaty obligations as a breach of alliance, and was treated as an act of war. We may well believe that the Naxians had failed to provide their quota of ships for an allied campaign and were treated by the Athenians as defectors. But there is probably more to the episode than strict enforcement of the military alliance. Thucydides gives a fairly detailed account of the siege of Thasos, which lasted over two years (465-463). Here the issue was not defaulting on obligations, but dispute over the mining revenues from the rich deposits on Mt. Pangaeum (Thuc. 1.100). The Thasians may have refused ships to the allied cause as a result of the dispute, but Thucydides makes it clear that it was the dispute over the mines that led them to such an action, and the revolt ended with their losing mines and trading sites on the mainland as well as their navy. They were committed to paying tribute and an indemnity. There may well have been some such dispute behind the revolt of Naxos. In any case the Athenians could have seized on any pretext to attack the island. The result of the siege would be to deprive it of a navy which might some day turn against Athens, render it defenceless against Athenian intervention and add to the allied war chest with a hefty tribute assessment. This was the first step in the demilitarisation of Athens’ allies, so that the Athenian fleet became the striking force of the alliance, its actions supported by financial contributions from an ever increasing pool of subject allies.
The major essay is due at the end of Week 14 of the semester (Friday, June 9) by 5.00 p.m.). This is a very late time; in the interests of equity this deadline should be regarded as absolute, and extensions will be granted only in exceptional circumstances (eg. supported by a medical certificate). Otherwise a penalty will be deducted for late submission.

Choose ONE of the following subjects, and discuss it on the basis of the ancient evidence, which should be cited systematically. Footnotes or Endnotes are to be numbered consecutively over the entire essay. Maximum is 2000 words (excluding footnotes). The main items of bibliography will be available in Short Loans. If you have difficulty finding anything, do not hesitate to consult your lecturer.

Question 1: The accuracy of Thucydides

‘Cleon and Brasidas were dead—the two people who on each side had been most opposed to peace, Brasidas because of the success and honour which had come to him through war, Cleon because he thought that in a time of peace and quiet people would be more likely to notice his evil doings and less likely to believe his slander of others.’

(Thucydides 5.16)

Examine Thucydides’ treatment of Cleon and Brasidas, and assess the extent to which his narrative is distorted by his personal prejudices:

Sources:

Use the index to Thucydides. Do not attempt to write complete biographies of Cleon and Brasidas. I suggest that you focus your discussion on the war over Amphipolis, and concentrate on the details of Thucydides’ narrative.

Reading:

The material in the tutorial handout Pylos and Sphacteria is relevant. See also Hornblower’s commentary on Thucydides 5.2-11. Specifically on Amphipolis you might consult the following

W. D. Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides
Question 2: The Melian Dialogue

“Melians: And how could it be just as good for us to be the slaves as for you to be the masters?
Athenians: You, by giving in, would save yourselves from disaster; we, by not destroying you, would be able to profit from you.”

(Thucydides 5.92-3)

What is Thucydides’ purpose in setting on record the Melian Dialogue? What does it tell us about the morality of the Athenian attitude to empire, and how “authentic” is Thucydides’ representation of the debate.

Sources:
The main requisite is a thorough knowledge of the text of the Dialogue (Thucydides 5.84-116). Compare Pericles’ speech on the perils of empire (2.55-64) and Cleon’s on the policing of empire (3.37-40).

Reading:
D. Kagan, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition
J. de Romilly, Thucydides and Athenian Imperialism (Oxford 1963) 273-310
C. Macleod, Collected Essays (Oxford 1983) 52-67
W. T. Loomis, The Spartan War Fund: IG V1, 1 and a New Fragment (Historia Einzelschriften 74. Stuttgart 1992): This discusses the relations between Melos and Sparta.
G. Crane, Thucydides and the Ancient Simplicity. The Limits of Political Realism (Berkeley: 1998), chapters 1 and 9.

Question 3: The Importance of Alcibiades

“They thought that he was aiming at tyranny, and so they turned against him. Although in the public capacity his conduct of the war was excellent, his private life made him objectionable to them each; thus they trusted their affairs to other hands, and before long ruined the city.”

(Thucydides 6.15)

What does Thucydides mean about excellence in Alcibiades conduct of the war, and to what period of Alcibiades’ career is he referring? How could Alcibiades have given the impression that he was bent on tyranny? Do not attempt to write a biography of Alcibiades. Focus your discussion on the quoted passage.
Sources:

The most important passages of Thucydides are compiled in the lecture handout ‘Alcibiades and Thucydides’. You should also consult Plutarch’s Lives of Alcibiades and Nicias.

Reading:
The literature listed in the tutorial sheet: “The Hermae and the Mysteries” is generally relevant to this topic. See also Westlake, Individuals in Thucydides 212-30 and the essay on Alcibiades and Thucydides in P. A. Brunt, Studies in Greek History and Thought 17-46.

Question 4

You choose your topic! You may write a major essay on any of the tutorial or lecture topics covered in class (with the exception of the Delian League). However, if you choose this option you must see the Course Controller in advance, in order to set an appropriate focus and bibliography. If students ignore this proviso, they may incur a heavy penalty. This last piece of assessment is worth 50%; the consultation with the lecturer is designed to prevent overly ambitious or unfocused work, which will undermine the end result.
(i) What was the original purpose of the alliance?
(ii) Why did the Spartans cede hegemony?
(iii) How was the alliance organized? On what basis did Athens’ domination rest?

*These issues are relevant to the first assessment task, the Short Essay. But you must address the Essay Question (see the Assessment section earlier in the Course Guide).

Sources:
See below for the main pieces of ancient evidence in translation. All the modern debate rests on these passages, and you should read and thoroughly absorb them before turning to the secondary literature. The article by Phyllis Culham is included in the Course Guide at the end of the booklet.

Reading:
R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire 42-50, 459-64
Anton Powell, Athens and Sparta 1-34
The “Delian League”: Source Passages

1a “The way in which Athens came to be placed in the circumstances under which her power grew was this. [2] After the Medes had returned from Europe, defeated by sea and land by the Hellenes, and after those of them who had fled with their ships to Mycale had been destroyed, Leotychides, King of the Lacedaemonians, the commander of the Hellenes at Mycale, departed home with the allies from Peloponnesse. But the Athenians and the allies from Ionia and Hellespont, who had now revolted from the king, remained and laid siege to Sestos, which was still held by the Medes. After wintering before it, they became masters of the place on its evacuation by the barbarians; and after this they sailed away from Hellespont to their respective cities. [3] Meanwhile the Athenian people, after the departure of the barbarian from their country, at once proceeded to carry over their children and wives, and such property as they had left, from the places where they had deposited them, and prepared to rebuild their city and their walls. For only isolated portions of the circumference had been left standing, and most of the houses were in ruins; though a few remained, in which the Persian grandees had taken up their quarters.”

(Thucydides 1.89)

1b “Meanwhile Pausanias, son of Cleombrotus, was sent out from Lacedaemon as commander-in-chief of the Hellenes, with twenty ships from Peloponnesse. With him sailed the Athenians with thirty ships, and a number of the other allies. [2] They made an expedition against Cyprus and subdued most of the island, and afterwards against Byzantium, which was in the hands of the Medes, and compelled it to surrender. This event took place while the Spartans were still supreme.

95.[1] But the violence of Pausanias had already begun to be disagreeable to the Hellenes, particularly to the Ionians and the newly liberated populations. These resorted to the Athenians and requested them as their kinsmen to become their leaders, and to stop any attempt at violence on the part of Pausanias. [2] The Athenians accepted their overtures, and determined to put down any attempt of the kind and to settle everything else as their interests might seem to demand. [3] In the meantime the Lacedaemonians recalled Pausanias for an investigation of the reports which had reached them. Manifold and grave accusations had been brought against him by Hellenes arriving in Sparta; and, to all appearance, there had been in him more of the mimicry of a despot than of the attitude of a general. [4] As it happened, his recall came just at the time when the hatred which he had inspired had induced the allies to desert him, the soldiers from Peloponnesse excepted, and to range themselves by the side of the Athenians. [5] On his arrival at Lacedaemon, he was censured for his private acts of oppression, but was acquitted on the heaviest counts and pronounced not guilty; it must be known that the charge of Medism formed one of the principal, and to all appearance one of the best-founded articles against him. [6] The Lacedaemonians did not, however, restore him to his command, but sent out Dorkis and certain others with a small force; who found the allies no longer inclined to concede to them the supremacy. [7] Perceiving this they departed, and the Lacedaemonians did not send out any to
succeed them. They feared for those who went out a deterioration similar to that observable in Pausanias; besides, they desired to be rid of the Median war, and were satisfied of the competency of the Athenians for the position, and of their friendship at the time towards themselves. 96. [1] The Athenians having thus succeeded to the supremacy by the voluntary act of the allies through their hatred of Pausanias, fixed which cities were to contribute money against the barbarian, which ships; their professed object being to retaliate for their sufferings by ravaging the king's country. [2] Now was the time that the office of ‘Treasurers for Hellas’ was first instituted by the Athenians. These officers received the tribute, as the money contributed was called. The tribute was first fixed at four hundred and sixty talents. The common treasury was at Delos, and the congresses were held in the temple. 97.[1] Their supremacy commenced with independent allies who acted on the resolutions of a common congress.”

(Thucydides 1.95-7)

1c “He came ostensibly for the Hellenic war, really to carry on his intrigues with the king, which he had begun before his recall, being ambitious of reigning over Hellas. [4] The circumstance which first enabled him to lay the king under an obligation, and to make a beginning of the whole design was this. [5] Some connections and kinsmen of the king had been taken in Byzantium, on its capture from the Medes, when he was first there, after the return from Cyprus. These captives he sent off to the king without the knowledge of the rest of the allies, the account being that they had escaped from him.”

(Thucydides 1.128)

1d “Between ourselves and the Athenians alliance began, when you withdrew from the Median war and they remained to finish the business. [3] But we did not become allies of the Athenians for the subjugation of the Hellenes, but allies of the Hellenes for their liberation from the Mede; [4] and as long as the Athenians led us fairly we followed them loyally; but when we saw them relax their hostility to the Mede, to try to compass the subjection of the allies, then our apprehensions began. [5] Unable, however, to unite and defend themselves, on account of the number of confederates that had votes, all the allies were enslaved, except ourselves and the Chians, who continued to send our contingents as independent and nominally free. [6] Trust in Athens as a leader, however, we could no longer feel, judging by the examples already given; it being unlikely that she would reduce our fellow-confederates, and not do the same by us who were left, if ever she had the power.”

(Thucydides 3.10)

2a “In the first days, before the sending to Sicily for alliance, there had been talk of entrusting the command at sea to the Athenians. However, when the allies resisted, the Athenians waived their claim, considering the safety of Hellas of prime importance and seeing that if they quarrelled over the leadership, Hellas must perish. In this they judged rightly, for civil strife is as much worse than united war as war is worse than peace. [2] Knowing that, they gave ground and waived their claim, but only so long as they had great need of the others. This is clear, for when they had driven the Persian back and the battle was no longer for

3 Better translated “until they requested them urgently.”
their territory but for his, they made a pretext of Pausanias’ highhandedness and took the command away from the Lacedaemonians. All that, however, took place later.”

(Herodotus 8.3)

2b “In this matter the Peloponnesians who were in charge were for removing the people from the lands of those Greek nations which had sided with the Persians and giving their land to the Ionians to dwell in. The Athenians disliked the whole plan of removing the Greeks from Ionia, or allowing the Peloponnesians to determine the lot of Athenian colonies, and as they resisted vehemently, the Peloponnesians yielded. [4] It accordingly came about that they admitted to their alliance the Samians, Chians, Lesbians, and all other islanders who had served with their forces, and bound them by pledge and oaths to remain faithful and not desert their allies. When the oaths had been sworn, the Greeks set sail to break the bridges, supposing that these still held fast. So they laid their course for the Hellespont.”

(Herodotus 9.106)

2c “The Greeks who had set out from Mykale for the Hellespont first anchored off Lectum having been stopped by contrary winds, and came from there to Abydos, where they found the bridges broken which they thought would still be in place; these were in fact the chief cause of their coming to the Hellespont. [2] The Peloponnesians then who were with Leutychides decided to sail away to Hellas, but the Athenians, with Xanthippus their general, that they would remain there and attack the Chersonesus. So the rest sailed away, but the Athenians crossed over to the Chersonesus and laid siege to Sestus.

(Herodotus 9.114)

3a “When he was sent out as general along with Cimon to prosecute the war, and saw that Pausanias and the other Spartan commanders were offensive and severe to the allies, he made his own intercourse with them gentle and humane, and induced Cimon to be on easy terms with them and to take an actual part in their campaigns, so that before the Lacedaemonians were aware, not by means of hoplites or ships or horsemen, but by tact and diplomacy he had stripped them of the leadership. [2] For, well disposed as the Hellenes were toward the Athenians on account of the justice of Aristides and the reasonableness of Cimon, they were made to long for their supremacy still more by the rapacity of Pausanias and his severity. The commanders of the allies ever met with angry harshness at the hands of Pausanias, and the common men he punished with stripes, or by compelling them to stand all day long with an iron anchor on their shoulders. [3] No one could get bedding or fodder or go down to a spring for water before the Spartans, nay, their servants armed with goads would drive away such as approached. On these grounds Aristides once had it in mind to chide and admonish him, but Pausanias scowled, said he was busy, and would not listen. [4] Subsequently the captains and generals of the Hellenes, and especially the Chians, Samians, and Lesbians, came to Aristides and tried to persuade him to assume the leadership and bring over to his support the allies, who had long wanted to be rid of the Spartans and to range themselves anew on the side of the Athenians. He replied that he saw the urgency and the justice of what they proposed, but that to establish Athenian confidence in them some overt act was needed, the doing of which
would make it impossible for the multitude to change their allegiance back again.

[5] So Uliades the Samian and Antagoras the Chian conspired together, and ran down the trireme of Pausanias off Byzantium, closing in on both sides of it as it was putting out before the line. When Pausanias saw what they had done, he sprang up and wrathfully threatened to show the world in a little while that these men had run down not so much his ship as their own native cities; but they bade him be gone, and be grateful to that fortune which fought in his favour at Plataea; it was because the Hellenes still stood in awe of this, they said, that they did not punish him as he deserved. And finally they went off and joined the Athenians. [6] Then indeed was the lofty wisdom of the Spartans made manifest in a wonderful way. When they saw that their commanders were corrupted by the great powers entrusted to them, they voluntarily abandoned the leadership and ceased sending out generals for the war, choosing rather to have their citizens discreet and true to their ancestral customs than to have the sway over all Hellas.”

(Plutarch Aristides 23)

3b “Next, Ion says, as was natural over the cups, the conversation drifted to the exploits of Cimon, and as his greatest deeds were being recounted, the hero himself dwelt at length on one particular stratagem which he thought his shrewdest. Once, he said, when the Athenians and their allies had taken many barbarian prisoners at Sestos and Byzantium and turned them over to him for distribution, he put into one lot the persons of the captives, and into another the rich adornments of their bodies, and his distribution was blamed as unequal. [3] But he bade the allies choose one of the lots, and the Athenians would be content with whichever one they left. So, on the advice of Herophytus the Samian to choose Persian wealth rather than Persians, the Allies took the rich adornments for themselves, and left the prisoners for the Athenians. At the time Cimon came off with the reputation of being a ridiculous distributor, since the allies had their gold anklets and armlets and collars and jackets and purple robes to display, while the Athenians got only naked bodies ill-trained for labour. [4] But a little while after, the friends and kinsmen of the captives came down from Phrygia and Lydia and ransomed every one of them at a great price, so that Cimon had four months' pay and rations for his fleet, and besides that, much gold from the ransoms was left over for the city. “

(Plutarch Cimon 9)

4 “So the rebuilding of the walls was directed by both these statesmen jointly, although they were at variance with one another; but the secession of the Ionian states from the Lacedaemonian alliance was promoted by Aristeides, who seized the opportunity when the Lacedaemonians were discredited because of Pausanias. [5] Hence it was Aristeides who assessed the tributes of the allied states on the first occasion, two years after the naval battle of Salamis, in the archonship of Timosthenes, and who administered the oaths to the Ionians when they swore to have the same enemies and friends, ratifying their oaths by letting the lumps of iron sink to the bottom out at sea.”

(Athenian Constitution 23)
(i) What was the Peloponnesian League, and how was it organised?
(ii) What was the Spartan government’s attitude to Athens in the years after the Persian Wars?
(iii) What was the effect of the great earthquake on Sparta and how did it affect her relations with Athens?

Sources:
Thucydides 1.101-3; 135-7
Plutarch, Themistocles 23-4; Cimon 16-17 (Penguin pp. 99-100, 158-61)
C. W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War 64-5, 66-7

Reading:
Cambridge Ancient History Vol. V (2nd edition)
R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire 86-90
P. Cartledge, Sparta and Lakonia 211-23.
Anton Powell, Athens and Sparta 96-113
(i) How aggressive was Athenian strategy in the three decades after the Persian Wars?
(ii) How important was the Persian expedition and the Athenian intervention in Cyprus?
(iii) What evidence do we have that there was a formal peace between Athens and the Persian regime in Asia Minor?

Sources:
Thucydides 1.101, 104-7, 112
Plutarch Cimon 12-14 (Penguin pp.153-7)
On the so-called Peace of Callias see C. W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War 97-103 (no. 95), where the relevant passages are listed in translation. This is essential.

Reading:
Cambridge Ancient History Vol. V (2nd edition)
R. Meiggs, The Athenian Empire 122-151, 473-95
Anton Powell, Athens and Sparta 35-58
E. Badian, From Plataea to Potidaea 1-72. A long and complex piece: pp. 17-29 are arguably the most important.
“It was in theory democracy, in practice rule by the first man” (Thucydides 2.65.9)

(i) What were the main reforms which took place in Athens between 462 and 457?
(ii) What was the basis for Pericles’ supremacy in Athens after 462?
(iii) What opposition did Pericles face, and how did he overcome it?

Sources:
Plutarch Cimon 15; Pericles 9-10; 15-16 (Penguin pp. 157-8, 173-6, 182-4)
C. W. Fornara Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War nos. 74, 109

Reading:
For general surveys see:
Cambridge Ancient History Vol. V (2nd edition)
J. K. Davies, Democracy and Classical Greece 62-75
W. G. Forrest, The Emergence of Greek Democracy 209-20

On the Aristotelian Constitution of Athens there is a massive commentary: P. J. Rhodes, Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenai on Politeia (Oxford 1981), esp. 309-44. Consult this for points of detail: it is technical and difficult!

On the opposition to Pericles see:
F. J. Frost, “Pericles, Thucydides and Athenian politics before the war”, Historia 13 (1964) 385-99

Other literature:
A. R. Burn, Pericles and Athens (London 1948)
W. R. Connor, Theopompus and Fifth-Century History (Cambridge, MA 1968)
The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens (Princeton 1971)
M. Ostwald, From Popular Sovereignty to the Sovereignty of Law (Berkeley 1986)
"By his (Pericles') Megarian enactment setting all the world ablaze".
(Aristophanes, Peace, 609)

"Then we went to war again on account of Megara"
(Andocides (5th century orator), On the Peace with Sparta, 8)

Discuss Thucydides' references to the Megarian Decree. Is his treatment of this topic adequate? If not, why not? How important was the Megarian Decree in causing hostilities to break out between Athens and Sparta in 431 B.C.?

Ancient Sources:
Thucydides: 1.67; 1.139.1-2; 1. 140.2-141; cf. 1.44.2: 145
Aristophanes Acharnians, 497-556; Peace, 603-48 (see attachment)
Diodorus: 12. 38-39 (see attachment)
C. W. Fornara, Archaic Times to the End of the Peloponnesian War, nos. 122-3 (pp135-7)

Modern Studies
D. Kagan, The Outbreak of the Peloponnesian War, ch. 15
R. P. Legon, Megara, 200-27
A. Powell, Athens and Sparta, esp. chapters 4 and 5
G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Origins of the Peloponnesian War, Chapter 7
AH 3051: Athens and Empire

Tutorial 6: Pylos and Sphacteria 425 BC

(I) Of what significance was the campaign?
(ii) What part was played by the element of Chance (tyche). Is it overemphasized by Thucydides?
(iii) Can the topographical details in Thucydides be accepted?
(iv) How biased is Thucydides’ account of Cleon’s actions?

Sources:

Thucydides 4.3-41 (excepting chapters 7, 24, 25). On any controversial point it is worth referring to S. Hornblower, A Commentary on Thucydides Vol. II (Oxford 1996); it refers to the text in Greek and in translation.
Plutarch, Nicias 7-8 (Penguin pp. 215-17)
Diodorus 12.61-3 (see attachment)
Pausanias 4.26.1-2 (see below)

They (the Messenians) were always obsessed with bitterness with the Spartans, and after this time they really showed how they hated them when the Peloponnesian War broke out with Athens. They offered Naupactus as a base against the Peloponnesian, and Messenian slingers from Naupactus helped to take the Spartans who were captured at Sphacteria.

After the Athenian disaster at Aegospotami (in 404) the victorious Laconian fleet threw the Messenians out of Naupactus: some went to their brothers in Sicily or to Rhegium, but most of them went to Libya, to Euhesperides.....Most of the Messenians went there, under the command of Comon who was also their general at Sphacteria.

Reading:

J. B. Wilson, Pylos 425 BC: A Historical and Topographical Study of Thucydides’ Account of the Campaign (Warminster 1979)
i. To whom or what do our ancient sources attribute the blame for the outrage and how much agreement exists on the details?

ii. Who were the politicians involved in the prosecutions and what can be inferred about their motives? What does the episode suggest about the weaknesses of the democracy?

iii. What was the involvement of Alcibiades? Was the outrage connected to the Sicilian Expedition?

Sources:

- Thucydides 6.27-9, 53, 60-1.
- Plutarch Alcibiades 19-21 (Penguin pp. 261-5)
- Isocrates in a speech written for Alcibiades' son, ca. 397 B.C. (see extract below)

Now the persons who first plotted against the democracy and established the Four Hundred, inasmuch as my father [Alcibiades] although he was repeatedly invited to join them would not do so, seeing that he was a vigorous opponent of their activities and a loyal supporter of the people, judged that they were powerless to upset the established order until he was removed out of their way. And since they knew that in matters pertaining to the gods the city would be most enraged if any man should be shown to be violating the Mysteries, and that in other matters if any man should dare to attempt the overthrow of the democracy, they combined both these charges and tried to bring an action of impeachment before the senate. They asserted that my father was holding meetings of his political club with a view to revolution, and that these members of the club when dining together in the house of Pulytion had given a performance of the Mysteries. The city was greatly excited by reason of the gravity of these charges, and a meeting of the Assembly was hastily called at which my father so clearly proved that the accusers were lying, that the people would have been glad to punish them, and furthermore elected him general for the Sicilian expedition. Thereupon he sailed away, judging that he had been already cleared of their calumnies; but his accusers, having united the Council and having made the public speakers subservient to themselves, again revived the matter and suborned performers. Why need I say more? they did not cease until they had recalled my father from the expedition and had put to death some of his friends and had banished others from the city.

Isocrates 16. 6-7 (Loeb Isocrates iii. 173ff)
Reading:

A. Andrewes in *Cambridge Ancient History* Vol. V (2nd edition) 446-51
D. Kagan, *The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition*
M. H. Hansen, *Eisangelia* (Odense, 1975) pp74-76
*K. J. Dover in Gomme, Andrewes, Dover, *Historical Commentary on Thucydides* 4.*